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INTRODUCTION 
Boubacar Bah, a fifty-two-year-old tailor from Guinea with a wife 
and young children, died in June 2007 in the custody of immigration 
officials after undergoing emergency surgery for a skull fracture and 
multiple brain hemorrhages that had left him comatose.  When in-
formation finally surfaced regarding his treatment in a New Jersey de-
tention facility run by the Corrections Corporation of America, de-
tails emerged about how he had been “shackled and pinned to the 
floor of the medical unit as he moaned and vomited [and] then left 
in a disciplinary cell for more than thirteen hours, despite repeated 
notations that he was unresponsive and intermittently foaming at the 
mouth.”1  A confidential video showed him handcuffed, face down in 
the medical unit crying out in his native Fulani, “Help, they are kill-
ing me!”2 
Mr. Bah’s story is just one of the many tragic stories reported on 
by Nina Bernstein,3 a writer for the New York Times who published a 
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 1 Nina Bernstein, Few Details on Immigrants Who Died in U.S. Custody, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 
2008, at A1. 
 2 Nina Bernstein, Officials Obscured Truth of Migrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2010, 
at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 3 Nina Bernstein received the 2009 Hillman Prize for Newspaper Journalism for her work 
exposing immigrant deaths in detention.  2011 Hillman Prize for Newspaper Journalism, 
SIDNEY HILLMAN FOUND., http://www.hillmanfoundation.org/hillman-prizes/hillman-
prize-newspaper-journalism (last visited Dec. 2, 2011).  In her acceptance speech at the 
awards ceremony, she referred to the immigration detention system as a “secretive billion 
dollar system; a patchwork of profit-making prisons, county lock-ups, and federal jails vir-
tually devoid of the due process safeguards that people who watch ‘Law & Order’ take for 
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series of scathing exposés of conditions at government and privately 
run immigration detention centers.  Each story is unbelievably more 
horrific than the next:  A twenty-two-year-old detainee at the Bergen 
County Jail in New Jersey committed suicide because of “unbearable, 
untreated pain.”4  A thirty-four-year-old computer engineer and fa-
ther of two died from undiagnosed and untreated cancer that ulti-
mately metastasized to cover his entire body.5  A mentally ill man with 
a history of schizophrenia died on August 22, 2004, after hanging 
himself with a bed sheet.  While detainees must be checked on every 
thirty minutes, this man had been dead “for at least four to six hours 
before his body was found.”6  A German-born forty-eight-year-old 
man, who had spent forty-two years in the United States, died in No-
vember 2008 in immigration detention from endocarditis, an infec-
tion of the heart valve that is easily cured by antibiotics.7  Immigration 
officials allowed his treatable infection to rage out of control:  “the 
bacteria colonizing his heart broke loose, creating abscesses in his 
brain, liver and kidneys.”8  His incredible pain, which caused him to 
sob through the night, went unacknowledged by immigration deten-
tion officials.9  Had they afforded him the medical attention he de-
served, he would most probably still be alive. 
All of the above stories share a common thread:  a complete lack 
of humanity towards immigrant detainees and desperate attempts to 
cover up abuses and deaths.10  The United States government has in-
 
granted.”  HillmanFoundation, 2009 Hillman Prize for Newspaper Journalism Awards Ceremo-
ny—Nina Bernstein, at 2:37, YOUTUBE (June 10, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=VQ0wdyCZ00U. 
 4 Bernstein, supra note 2, at A1. 
 5 Nina Bernstein, Ill and in Pain, Detainee Dies in U.S. Hands, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at 
A1. 
 6 AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE:  IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 41 
(2009), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/uploads/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 7 Nina Bernstein, Another Jail Death, and Mounting Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009, at 
A14. 
 8 Id.  
 9 Id. 
 10 According to Nina Bernstein’s review of deaths in immigration detention centers, “[n]o 
government body is required to keep track of deaths and publicly report them.  No inde-
pendent inquiry is mandated.”  Bernstein, supra note 1, at A18.  Critics and many mem-
bers of Congress have openly stated that this process “leaves too much to the agency’s 
discretion, allowing some deaths to be swept under the rug while potential witnesses are 
transferred or deported.”  Id.  A more recent review of the conditions within immigration 
detention facilities reveals that not much has improved.  See ACLU OF ARIZ, IN THEIR OWN 
WORDS:  ENDING ABUSE IN ARIZONA IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTERS 3 (2011), available 
at http://acluaz.org/sites/default/files/documents/detention%20report%202011.pdf 
(providing a report on the inhumane treatment of immigrant detainees in Arizona). 
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creased its use of civil detention for noncitizens11 and with that in-
crease has come a corresponding decrease in adherence to detention 
standards.  Common complaints include “inadequate health care, 
physical and sexual abuse, overcrowding, discrimination, and rac-
ism.”12  Additionally, while the Obama Administration has announced 
an overhaul of the immigration detention system, it has concurrently 
refused to create legally binding rules, arguing that “‘rule-making 
would be laborious, time-consuming and less flexible’” than a simple 
overhaul.13 
Another contributing factor to deteriorating conditions of con-
finement has to do with economics:  the business of immigration de-
tention is booming.  As the federal government continues to target, 
detain, and deport noncitizens, the demand for more immigration 
detention beds has increased exponentially.14  The GEO Group, an 
international private prison operator that controls about a quarter of 
the United States private prison industry, is adding thousands of beds 
to its detention centers nationwide, while Corrections Corporation of 
America, which manages more than 50% of all prison beds under 
private contract in America, saw its revenue from its federal custom-
ers increase by almost 5%.15  These corporations are cramming as 
many beds as they can into their facilities to fulfill increased demand. 
As these corporations thrive and prosper, the detained nonciti-
zens they house suffer.  On any given day, more than 32,000 people 
are held in detention while the government decides whether to de-
port them, with the annual total reaching an astounding 407,000 
 
 11 This Comment will endeavor to use the term “noncitizen” instead of “alien” when refer-
ring to non-nationals because of the dehumanizing qualities associated with the term 
“alien.”  That term will only be used when necessary, as when in direct quotations. 
 12 SUNITA PATEL & TOM JAWETZ, ACLU, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION FACILITIES 1 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/prison/unsr
_briefing_materials.pdf. 
 13 Nina Bernstein, Documents Reveal Earlier Immigrant Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/nyregion/10detainside.html?ref=incustodydeath 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14 Interestingly, the private prison industry itself has helped to facilitate an increase in de-
mand for prison beds.  According to a report by National Public Radio, members of this 
industry waged a “quiet, behind-the-scenes effort to help draft and pass Arizona Senate 
Bill 1070,” which would require police to detain anyone they stopped who could not show 
proof of a legal entry into this country.  See Laura Sullivan, Prison Economics Help Drive Ariz. 
Immigration Law, NPR (Oct. 28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyId=130833741. 
 15 Renee Feltz, Focus on “Criminal Aliens” Increases Demand for Immigration Detention Business, 
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 5, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/renee-feltz/focus-on-
criminal-aliens_b_347303.html. 
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people.16  The current immigration practices are supported by Presi-
dent Obama, who signed the Department of Homeland Security’s 
2010 budget into law.  The budget included $2.5 billion for detention 
and removal operations and another $200 million for the Secure 
Communities program, which screens for undocumented immigrants 
by taking the fingerprints of anyone booked into local jail and match-
ing them with fingerprints in an Immigration and Customs Enforce-
ment (“ICE”) database in an effort to maximize immigrant detention 
and removal.17 
These individuals, regardless of their immigration status, are hu-
man beings deserving of the same dignity and respect afforded to cit-
izens of the United States.  Immigration detention, now a thriving 
business in the United States, allows private contractors to make 
money off of treating noncitizens worse than caged animals, which 
does not fit well with the world’s notion of the United States as a bea-
con of morality. 
This Comment will argue that while detained noncitizens do have 
some constitutional rights that allow them to protest their arbitrary 
detention, including the duration of their confinement, those rights 
do not fully extend to protecting them from the cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment they are subject to while in custody.  Additional-
ly, even though rights to lodge due process arguments exist under 
the Constitution, it is incredibly difficult to obtain relief, and the cas-
es generally require much litigation, which is especially expensive 
since immigrant detainees do not have a right to counsel. 
Thus, this Comment proposes that noncitizen detainees lodge 
Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) claims based on the customary interna-
tional norm prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  
After discussing a brief history of the constitutional protections now 
afforded to detained noncitizens and the incredible difficulty of bas-
ing a compensation claim on constitutional violations, this Comment 
will then discuss the development of ATS litigation, its increased re-
 
 16 See In-Custody Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference
/timestopics/subjects/i/immigration_detention_us/incustody_deaths/index.html (stat-
ing that over 407,000 noncitizens were held in detention in the United States in 2008). 
 17 See Feltz, supra note 15 (describing the screening efforts of the Secure Communities Pro-
gram).  See also Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, FY2011:  ICE 
Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Clear Priorities Including 
Threats to Public Safety and National Security (Oct. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018washingtondc.htm, for information on 
the government’s most recent data on removals during fiscal year 2011.  ICE touted its 
removal of 396,906 immigrants as a great policy achievement, one that follows the United 
States’ policy to detect, detain, and remove those without status from this country.  Id. 
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levance to cases of abuse in immigration detention, and some poten-
tial issues that detainees will need to address to lodge successful 
claims. 
I.  WHAT DOES THE CONSTITUTION SAY? 
The Constitution does not completely abandon noncitizens.  
Many detained noncitizens have successfully brought due process 
claims under the Fifth Amendment challenging the duration of their 
confinement.  These cases, along with the recent spur of Guantana-
mo cases, have helped to delineate the boundaries of appropriate 
behavior regarding the confinement of noncitizens, whether within 
the United States or abroad.  Additionally, the Court has allowed 
plaintiffs to recover damages for constitutional violations committed 
by federal agents in certain, highly limited circumstances.  However, 
this Comment will show that these constitutional remedies have prov-
en to be ineffective and nearly impossible to achieve when lodging a 
claim protesting conditions of confinement in immigration detention 
centers. 
A. Brief History 
The movement towards greater constitutional protections for 
noncitizens essentially started with Yick Wo v. Hopkins,18 where the Su-
preme Court stated that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to the Con-
stitution is not confined to the protection of citizens. . . . [Its] provi-
sions are universal in their application, to all persons within the 
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of 
color, or of nationality . . . .”19  Around ten years later, when address-
ing the Fifth Amendment in Wong Wing v. United States,20 the Court 
concluded that “all persons within the territory of the United States 
are entitled to the protection guaranteed by [the Fifth and Sixth] 
[A]mendments, and that even aliens shall not be held to answer for a 
capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a grand jury.”21  The Court then extended its sentiments al-
most a century later in Mathews v. Diaz22 when it proclaimed: 
 
 18 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
 19 Id. at 369. 
 20 163 U.S. 228 (1896). 
 21 Id. at 238. 
 22 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (confirming the Constitution’s recognition of aliens even while reject-
ing the due process claim challenging a five-year residency requirement for noncitizens 
seeking federal medical benefits). 
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There are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United 
States.  The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, 
protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law.  Even one whose presence in this 
country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitu-
tional protection.23 
The Fifth Amendment itself proclaims that “[n]o person shall 
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law”24 and has been heavily employed by noncitizens detained in im-
migration detention centers for long periods of time.  Thus, from this 
provision has sprouted a veritable fountain of case law dealing with 
the procedural and substantive protections due noncitizens, includ-
ing those who are not officially considered as having entered the 
United States. 
B. What Exactly Is “Civil Confinement”? 
Before considering the case law, it is first important to understand 
the nature of civil confinement in the United States.  The Supreme 
Court has enunciated some basic principles applicable to the civil 
confinement of noncitizens.  In a recent decision, the Court stated 
that “‘government detention violates th[e Due Process] Clause’ un-
less it is imposed as punishment in a criminal proceeding conforming 
to the rigorous procedures constitutionally required for such pro-
ceedings, or ‘in certain special and narrow non-punitive circums-
tances.’”25  The Court then went on to explain what it meant by “spe-
cial” and “non-punitive” detention and stated that such detention is 
“permissible only where an individual (1) is either in criminal or im-
migration proceedings and has been shown to be a danger to the 
community or [a] flight risk;26 (2) is dangerous because of a ‘harm-
threatening mental illness’ that impairs his ability to control his dan-
gerousness;27 or (3) is an enemy alien during a declared war.”28  Thus, 
“civil detention must be measured and tempered by individualized 
 
 23 Id. at 77 (citations omitted). 
 24 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 25 David Cole, In Aid of Removal:  Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 
1003, 1010 (2002) (alterations in original) (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 
(2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26 Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 688; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752–53 
(1987); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 541–42 (1952)). 
 27 Id. (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2002); Kansas 
v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997)). 
 28 Id. (citing Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171–73 (1948)). 
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decision making and by finding that the individual presents a ‘danger 
to the community’ or a ‘flight risk.’”29 
Immigration detention is thus meant to serve a very limited func-
tion, one distinct from the penal nature of criminal incarceration.30  
Its purpose is to “hold, process, and prepare individuals for remov-
al,”31 with its most severe form, mandatory detention with no possibili-
ty of an individualized bond determination, only passing constitu-
tional muster because it is “premised on the idea that immigration 
detention is so limited in scope, purpose, and duration.”32  These 
conceptions of immigration detention also comport with internation-
al law, which requires that “detention pending removal must be justi-
fied as a necessary and proportionate measure in each individual case 
and should only be used as a measure of last resort and be subject to 
judicial review.”33 
The reality of immigration detention though is neither limited in 
purpose nor scope.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 
(“INA”), in Section 1226 for example, creates a presumption of de-
tention for people apprehended by the federal government at the 
border who lack documents for admission, regardless of whether or 
not they pose a flight risk.34  This includes the mandatory detention 
of “asylum seekers, torture survivors, victims of human trafficking, 
longtime lawful permanent residents, and the parents of U.S. citizen 
children.”35 
After apprehension then, access to some sort of judicial review 
depends on whether the individual was apprehended at the border, 
apprehended within the United States, or convicted of certain crimes 
while in the United States.36  For those captured at the border, deci-
sions regarding detention are made by immigration officers as these 
 
 29 Lenni B. Benson, As Old as the Hills:  Detention and Immigration, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 11, 14 (2010). 
 30 N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW IMMIGRANT RIGHTS CLINIC, LOCKED UP BUT NOT FORGOTTEN 3 
(2010) [hereinafter Locked Up But Not Forgotten], available at 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/20100429_detentionreport_Apri
l2010.pdf. 
 31 DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp
/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf. 
 32 LOCKED UP BUT NOT FORGOTTEN, supra note 30, at 3. 
 33 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 6. 
 34 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (2006) (“[A]n alien may 
be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from 
the United States.”). 
 35 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 6, at 3. 
 36 Id. at 6. 
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individuals are not entitled to judicial review of their detention.37  
The situation for those apprehended inside the United States is func-
tionally equivalent to those captured at the border because even 
though these individuals are entitled to review by an immigration 
judge, this review oftentimes does not take place or is greatly de-
layed.38  Finally, those individuals who have resided in the United 
States for many years and are oftentimes legal permanent residents 
are subject to mandatory detention if convicted of committing a spe-
cified type of crime.  They are not afforded a hearing to determine 
their status and are automatically detained while awaiting deporta-
tion.  The process itself is flawed in that with increasing frequency, 
U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents have spent months or 
years in detention before being able to prove that they are not de-
portable.39 
C. Constitutional Case Law 
It is from this expansive use of civil confinement40 that a series of 
Supreme Court cases emerged challenging the authority of the fed-
eral government both to detain noncitizens for extended periods of 
time and to hold them in conditions that did not conform with estab-
lished standards.  Zadvydas v. Davis41 is the first in a series of major 
cases highlighting the Court’s desire to exert some sort of restraint 
on the broad authority brandished by immigration authorities.  Kes-
tutis Zadvydas immigrated to the United States from a displaced per-
sons camp in Germany at the age of eight.42  As a resident noncitizen, 
he accrued a lengthy criminal record that culminated in a cocaine 
distribution conviction that rendered him deportable after he fi-
 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 7. 
 40 John Morton, the Assistant Secretary of ICE, in a statement before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Appropriations regarding proposed budget increases for 
the fiscal year 2012, boasted of a 40% increase in the average daily detention population 
at ICE facilities and the overall arrest of 55,212 individuals in 2011 as support for the 
work ICE does and its continued need for funds.  See U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement FY 2012 Budget Request Before the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on Ap-
propriations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of John Morton, U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enforcement), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/speeches/
031111morton.pdf.  Nina Bernstein’s article on immigration detention further confirms 
the expansive use of civil confinement.  She states that the immigration detention system 
“continues to detain some 400,000 people a year.”  Nina Bernstein, Sick Detained Immigrant 
to Appeal to U.N. for Help, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2010, at A27. 
 41 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 42 Id. at 684. 
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nished serving his criminal sentence.43  However, given the circums-
tances of his birth, Mr. Zadvydas did not possess citizenship in any 
other country and consequently, the United States was unable to 
identify any country willing to accept him.44  While Section 241 of the 
INA provides that a removal order must be effectuated within ninety 
days, it also provides that the Attorney General can determine that 
certain noncitizens “may be detained beyond the removal period.”45  
Thus, the government argued that this provision permitted them to 
detain Mr. Zadvydas indefinitely while they continued to identify a 
country willing to accept him,46 which in turn prompted Mr. Zadvydas 
to file a writ of habeas corpus challenging his detention on Fifth 
Amendment grounds.47 
The Court held that “a statute permitting indefinite detention of 
an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem” and that 
“[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government custody, deten-
tion, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the li-
berty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.”48  But, in declining to 
overrule Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,49 the Court did also 
make a significant distinction between those noncitizens who had al-
ready entered the United States, like Zadvydas, and those whose ex-
tended departure required them to seek reentry into the United 
States, as was the case in Mezei.  According to the Court in Zadvydas, 
being treated “as if stopped at the border” made all the difference.50  
However, once noncitizens officially enter the country, “the legal cir-
cumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘per-
sons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their pres-
ence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”51  In 
addition to this distinction, the Court also limited the executive de-
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. (“In 1994, Germany told the INS that it would not accept Zadvydas because he was not 
a German citizen . . . Lithuania refused to accept Zadvydas because he was neither a Li-
thuanian citizen nor a permanent resident. . . . [T]he INS asked the Dominican Republic 
(Zadvydas’ wife’s country) to accept him, but this effort proved unsuccessful.”). 
 45 Id. at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)(Supp. V 1994) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted)). 
 46 Id. at 689. 
 47 Id. at 686. 
 48 Id. at 690. 
 49 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
 50 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213, 215) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (stating 
that the Fifth Amendment’s protections do not extend to aliens outside the territorial 
boundaries). 
 51 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. 
790 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:3 
 
tention power to “a period reasonably necessary to bring about that 
alien’s removal from the United States,” which it held to be six 
months “in light of the Constitution’s demands.”52 
After its landmark decision in Zadvydas, the Court in subsequent 
decisions, both narrowed and expanded its holding.53  In Demore v. 
Kim, a five-to-four majority held that a permanent resident alien, who 
had conceded removability due to a conviction, could be detained 
during the pendency of the removal proceedings and the administra-
tive appeal.54  The Court determined that mandatory detention with-
out the possibility of bond during removal proceedings, even if the 
particular individual posed no flight risk, was not an unconstitutional 
deprivation of liberty.  It assumed that the detention period would be 
brief, relying on agency data that indicated that the vast majority of 
immigration cases were decided in less than forty-seven days.55  But in 
Clark v. Martinez,56 the Supreme Court broadened its holding in Zad-
vydas so that it applied to inadmissible noncitizens as well.57  The 
Court reiterated its holding in Zadvydas, stating that the “presumptive 
period during which the detention of an alien is reasonably necessary 
to effectuate his removal is six months; after that, the alien is eligible 
for conditional release if he can demonstrate that there is ‘no signifi-
cant likelihood of removal in the reasonably forseeable future.’”58  It 
then extended the application of its holding to “inadmissible 
alien[s].”59 
D. A New Era in Constitutional Litigation:  The Guantanamo Cases 
Jurisprudence regarding the rights due to noncitizens and the 
conditions of their confinement has reached an apex in what some 
are terming “The Guantanamo Era.”60  This term connotes a time pe-
 
 52 Id. at 689. 
 53 See Won Kidane, The Alienage Spectrum Disorder:  The Bill of Rights from Chinese Exclusion to 
Guantanamo, 20 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 89, 141 (2010) (speculating that the difference in 
the Supreme Court’s approach in Zadvydas as compared with Demore was the events oc-
curring on 9/11). 
 54 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 55 See id. at 527–29 (stating the Executive Office for Immigration Review statistics that 85% 
of all detained cases were completed within an average of forty-seven days and the me-
dian was thirty days of detention). 
 56 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
 57 Id. at 386. 
 58 Id. at 378 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001)). 
 59   Clark, 543 U.S. at 372. 
 60 See Kidane, supra note 53, at 140. 
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riod punctuated by new legislation like the Patriot Act of 200161 and 
the Real ID Act of 200562 which have made some revisions to existing 
laws relating mainly to terrorism and have significantly expanded the 
Attorney General’s authority to arrest, detain, and deport immi-
grants.  But this time period has also been marked by a period of un-
expected response by the judiciary, whose decisions have been more 
closely aligned with Zadvydas in an effort to more closely protect the 
rights of noncitizens against arbitrary decision-making by the execu-
tive and legislative branches.  The following cases focus on unconsti-
tutional restrictions on the writ of habeas corpus and, although the 
claims that follow were lodged by individuals designated enemy com-
batants or detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, the case holdings are 
significant since habeas review has historically played an important 
role as a means for noncitizen immigrant detainees to challenge re-
moval orders.63 
In Rasul v. Bush, the first of many Guantanamo cases, the Court 
struck down the executive’s efforts to indefinitely detain aliens in 
Guantanamo Bay, holding that the Constitution prohibited such in-
definite detention of aliens without due process.64  Hamdan v. Rums-
feld articulated the amount of process necessary to be deemed ac-
ceptable by holding that the executive’s attempt to use a military 
commission with questionable procedural safeguards was inade-
quate.65  Finally the Court, in the landmark decision of Boumediene v. 
Bush, held that noncitizens detained by United States authorities out-
side of the territorial United States have a constitutional right to ha-
beas corpus, in spite of being designated as enemy combatants by the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal.66  That holding is sure to have 
widespread effects on the state of immigration detention, especially 
 
 61 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 62 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). 
 63 See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305–06 (2001) (“[B]efore and after the enactment in 
1875 of the first statute regulating immigration . . . [federal habeas corpus] jurisdiction 
was regularly invoked on behalf of noncitizens, particularly in the immigration context.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 64 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (“Congress extended the protections of the writ 
[of habeas corpus] to ‘all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty 
in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 65 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006) (concluding that “the military commis-
sion convened to try Hamdan lacks power to proceed”). 
 66 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–54 (2008). 
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since the Court indicated that its analysis was not limited to habeas 
review for Guantanamo detainees and should extend to other forms 
of executive detention as well.67 
The Boumediene holding has also had reverberating effects on two 
doctrines crucial to the understanding of immigration detention:  the 
plenary power doctrine and the entry fiction doctrine.  The plenary 
power doctrine essentially states that Congress and the executive 
branch must have “unfettered authority to admit, exclude, or deport 
aliens.”68  In response to the plenary power argument advanced by the 
government in Boumediene, the Court stated that “[t]o hold the politi-
cal branches have the power to switch the Constitution on and off at 
will . . . would permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of 
government, leading to a regime in which Congress and the Presi-
dent, not the Court, say ‘what the law is.’”69 
The entry fiction doctrine developed to prevent unauthorized 
aliens from obtaining increased constitutional protections just by vir-
tue of their physical presence in the United States.70  With regard to 
this doctrine then, it has been argued that the functional approach 
articulated by the Court in Boumediene, that “whether a constitutional 
provision has extraterritorial effect depends upon the ‘particular cir-
cumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives 
which Congress had before it,’”71 should be used to provide a check 
on the executive and legislative powers with respect to the treatment 
of inadmissible aliens.  The approach should be used as a means to 
extend constitutional protections to those noncitizens physically 
present within the United States.72 
 
 67 Id. at 787–88. 
 68 Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous Bor-
der of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1128 (1995) (discussing 
the legal challenges to U.S. detainment policies and procedures). 
 69 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 
(1803) (holding that Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is unconstitutional on the 
grounds that Congress cannot pass laws that are contrary to the Constitution, and it is the 
role of the judicial system to interpret what the Constitution permits)). 
 70 Charles Ellison, Extending Due Process Protections to Unadmitted Aliens Within the U.S. Through 
the Functional Approach of Boumediene, 3 CRIT. 1, 36 (2010) (discussing the potential for 
affording due process rights to unadmitted aliens). 
 71 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that the 
Constitution supersedes all treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate)). 
 72 Ellison, supra note 70, at 45.  But see Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 
(2010) (restricting the use of the Boumediene holding for those detainees who wish to con-
stitutionally protest the conditions of their confinement and stating that “the [Boume-
diene] Court expressly declined to ‘discuss the reach of the writ [of habeas corpus] with 
respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or confinement’ . . . which clearly 
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E. Challenges to Conditions of Confinement 
With the Supreme Court’s holdings in decisions like Zadvydas and 
Boumediene, it is clear that detained noncitizens, both inside and out-
side the United States, have some constitutional protections, especial-
ly when contesting the duration of their detention.  But the extension 
of constitutional due process protections to those noncitizens chal-
lenging conditions of confinement is not as clear.  The Supreme 
Court has not really addressed this issue, and those circuit courts that 
have are not in perfect alignment with one another.  While there has 
been some recognition of a noncitizen’s constitutional right to hu-
mane treatment, the bar to prove mistreatment has been set quite 
high in some circuits. 
In an important Fifth Circuit case that has been the law of that 
circuit for over two decades,73 Lynch v. Cannatella74 considered wheth-
er sixteen Jamaican nationals who had entered the United States ille-
gally by stowing away aboard a barge75 were entitled to any protection 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  The Lynch 
plaintiffs claimed that the officers detaining them, the New Orleans 
Harbor Police, had beaten them, showered them with stun gas, de-
prived them of food, sprayed them with a fire hose, and left them 
with only wet clothes and bedding materials.76  The Harbor Police 
claimed qualified immunity, which required a showing that “their 
conduct [did] not violate clearly established statutory or constitution-
al rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”77  They ar-
gued that since excludable aliens were not entitled to due process 
protection, the plaintiffs did not have a “clearly established” constitu-
tional right to be protected from abuse or mistreatment while in cus-
tody.78  The court struck down that argument. 
While the court acknowledged that excludable aliens had limited 
constitutional rights “with regard to immigration and deportation 
proceedings,” it held that that precedent “does not limit the [consti-
tutional] right of excludable aliens detained within the United States 
 
strips courts of jurisdiction over claims relating to ‘any aspect of . . . treatment . . . or con-
ditions of confinement’”) (citations omitted)). 
 73 Ellison, supra note 70, at 43. 
 74 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987). 
 75 Id. at 1367, 1370.  Because they were never inspected and admitted, they were treated as 
though they were at the border.  Id. 
 76 Id. at 1367. 
 77 Taylor, supra note 68, at 1144  (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
 78 Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1372–74 (relying on Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1449 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (holding that Mariel Cubans seeking parole could not claim due process pro-
tection)). 
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territory to humane treatment.”79  The court further stated that there 
are no conceivable “national interests that would justify the malicious 
infliction of cruel treatment on a person in [the] United 
States . . . simply because that person is an excludable alien.”80  Thus 
the court concluded that “whatever due process rights excludable 
aliens may be denied by virtue of their status, they are entitled under 
the due process clauses of the [F]ifth and [F]ourteenth 
[A]mendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the hands of state 
or federal officials.”81 
Lynch seemingly proclaimed that regardless of their status under 
immigration law, excludable noncitizens could claim due process 
protections to challenge the conditions of their confinement.  How-
ever, this proclamation was not adhered to by all circuits and some 
later cases narrowed this holding by suggesting that excludable aliens 
must show “malicious infliction of cruel treatment” or “gross physical 
abuse” to state viable due process claims,82 essentially making it im-
possible for detainees to challenge the conditions of their confine-
ment in a civil suit. 
Following its holding in Lynch, the Fifth Circuit considered Medina 
v. O’Neill, a case involving twenty-six Colombian noncitizens who at-
tempted to enter the United States as stowaways.83  Once discovered, 
they were detained together for twenty-four hours a day in a single 
cell designed for six people in a private facility, conditions that drove 
them to mount an escape attempt that resulted in the death of one 
and the injury of another.84  The stowaways then claimed that because 
immigration authorities had not monitored the detention facilities 
they had been placed in, their detention inflicted punishment in vi-
olation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.85  The 
Fifth Circuit, having previously differentiated between the treatment 
to be afforded to deportable versus inadmissible noncitizens in de-
tention, found that while under INA § 1252(c), the Attorney General 
must provide appropriate detention facilities to deportable aliens, 
there is no such statutory duty to ensure that proper facilities are also 
provided for inadmissible aliens.86  Thus, despite the fact that one 
stowaway was shot and another was injured, the court held that in 
 
 79 Id. at 1373. 
 80 Id. at 1374. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Taylor, supra note 68, at 1148 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 83 838 F.2d 800, 801 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 802. 
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terms of their substantive due process rights, there was no evidence of 
intentional cruel treatment being maliciously inflicted upon them or 
that they suffered gross physical abuse.87  Their allegations against the 
INS officials were found to be no more than claims of negligence, in-
sufficient to state a violation of due process rights.88 
The significance of the Medina holding and its import to detained 
immigrants who wish to challenge the conditions of their confine-
ment (especially in the Fifth Circuit) is that it seems to “convert the 
factual allegations in Lynch into a threshold standard for all excluda-
ble alien detainees . . . . [T]he Medina court suggested ‘malicious in-
fliction of cruel treatment’ or ‘gross physical abuse’ were prerequi-
sites for excludable aliens to state a due process violation.”89 
Two years later, in Adras v. Nelson,90 the Eleventh Circuit, like Me-
dina, “extracted language from Lynch to set an unusually high thre-
shold for excludable aliens seeking to challenge the condition of 
their confinement.”91  The Haitian plaintiffs in Adras challenged the 
conditions of their confinement at the Krome Detention Center in 
southern Florida,92 claiming that they were subjected to “severe over-
crowding, insufficient nourishment, inadequate medical treatment 
and other conditions of ill-treatment arising from inadequate facili-
ties and care.”93  The court first noted that immigration policies re-
garding the rights of inadmissible noncitizens were to be determined 
by Congress and the executive branch, not the judiciary.94  However, 
the court could determine whether the Haitian detainees could claim 
that they had suffered “gross physical abuse” or “intentional and ma-
 
 87 Id. at 803. 
 88 Id.; see also Taylor, supra note 68, at 1148 (suggesting that the Medina court misapplied the 
leading Supreme Court decision delineating the analysis to be used when pretrial detai-
nees bring due process challenges to the conditions of their confinement); id. at 1147 
n.308 (explaining that under Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979), pretrial detainees 
are protected from any mistreatment “amount[ing] to punishment of the detainee”).  
But the Medina court concluded that the Bell “punishment” standard was undermined by 
later cases holding that simple negligence did not amount to a due process violation.  838 
F.2d at 803.  Thus the defendants in Medina succeeded in their argument that they had 
never been to the facility and had no reason to believe it to be inadequate.  Id. 
 89 Taylor, supra note 68, at 1148 (citations omitted). 
 90 917 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1990). 
 91 Taylor, supra note 68, at 1149. 
 92 Adras, 917 F.2d at 1553. 
 93 Id. at 1559 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 94 Id. at 1556 (citing Perez-Perez v. Hanberry, 781 F.2d 1477, 1479 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding 
that the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, does not authorize the appointment and 
compensation of counsel in a habeas corpus action brought by an excludable alien chal-
lenging the Attorney General’s refusal to parole him)). 
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licious infliction of harm by INS agents” under the Lynch standard.95  
It then reasoned that while “any type of detention causes humiliation, 
disgrace and injured feelings . . . . Still, the detention was lawful at all 
times.”96  The court found no conflict between its ruling and that of 
Lynch because “[t]here [wa]s no allegation of ‘gross physical abuse’ 
or intentional and malicious infliction of harm by INS agents.”97 
Thus, the legacy post-Lynch is one that places a heavy burden on 
detained immigrants attempting to achieve some sort of judicial rec-
ognition of their mistreatment.  While other circuits that have delibe-
rated cases involving noncitizens challenging their conditions of con-
finement have not articulated as stringent a standard as the Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits, their varied decisions still fall short of adequately 
remedying the widespread inhumane treatment that most immi-
grants in detention centers experience.  The Third Circuit, in an un-
published opinion, stated that immigration detainees are to receive 
the same due process protections as pre-trial criminal detainees but 
then explained that “the test is whether the challenged conditions 
amount to punishment under the Due Process Clause” and that 
“[a]bsent a showing of express intent to punish, the determination 
will normally turn on whether the conditions have an alternative 
purpose and whether the conditions appear excessive in relation to 
that purpose.”98  Here again, the burden of proof placed on immi-
grant detainees is incredibly difficult to satisfy. 
The Second Circuit has failed to articulate one standard when 
dealing with immigrant detainee claims.  In a recent district court 
case, Adekoya v. Holder, the court stated that “[d]eliberate indifference 
to the medical needs of an immigrant detainee in certain circums-
tances gives rise to a cognizable claim under the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.”99  But, it remains unclear whether unad-
mitted noncitizens are entitled to the same level of protection as pre-
trial criminal detainees or whether they are entitled to the “gross 
physical abuse” standard articulated in Lynch. 
A ray of light for detained noncitizens can be found in the Ninth 
Circuit, which has held that conditions of confinement for civil de-
tainees must be superior not only to convicted prisoners, but also to 
pre-trial criminal detainees.100  Conditions of confinement which are 
 
 95 Id. at 1559 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Dahlan v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 215 Fed. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 99 751 F. Supp. 2d 688, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
100 Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 820 (2005). 
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found to be identical to, similar to, or more restrictive than those un-
der which pre-trial detainees or convicted prisoners are held, are pre-
sumptively punitive and unconstitutional.101  And, importantly, in the 
Ninth Circuit, civilly confined persons need not prove deliberate in-
difference to demonstrate a violation of their constitutional rights.102  
However, although the Ninth Circuit has taken a stride in the right 
direction, it is not a comprehensive enough remedy to fully afford re-
lief to the many immigrants currently held in detention throughout 
the United States. 
Thus, detained nonimmigrants still face incredible burdens when 
attempting to prove mistreatment while in custody.  The standard ar-
ticulated by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, that noncitizen detainees 
allege “deliberate cruelty or severe physical abuse” to overcome a 
qualified immunity defense, or even state a viable claim,103 which was 
rejected as too stringent by the Supreme Court for convicted prison-
ers challenging the conditions of their confinement under the Eighth 
Amendment, leaves alien detainees with very thin constitutional pro-
tections against inhumane treatment.104 
F. Potential Remedy Already in Existence? 
At first glance, there appears to be a solution for detained nonciti-
zens protesting the conditions of their confinement in Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,105 where the Su-
preme Court held that under certain circumstances, a plaintiff may 
be entitled to recover money damages for injuries suffered as a result 
of a government actor’s violation of the Constitution.106  The claim 
can essentially be analyzed as a “personal injury action for infringe-
ments of constitutional rights.”107  But upon further reflection, it will 
become clear that the Bivens action is not a viable option for detained 
noncitizens, most importantly because a Bivens claim must be 
grounded in some sort of constitutional violation and, as demonstrat-
ed above, couching complaints regarding conditions of confinement 
in constitutional terms is almost impossible.  So while there exists a 
potential constitutional remedy, it is just not adequate to fulfill the 
 
101 Id. at 934. 
102 Id. 
103 Taylor, supra note 68, at 1151. 
104 Id. at 1152. 
105 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
106 Id. at 397. 
107 Steve Helfand, Desensitization to Border Violence & the Bivens Remedy to Effectuate Systemic 
Change, 12 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87, 108 (2001). 
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needs of detained noncitizens who wish to protest the conditions of 
their confinement. 
In Bivens, six federal agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics un-
lawfully entered the plaintiff’s apartment and conducted an illegal 
search of the premises.108  Bivens asserted a claim under the Fourth 
Amendment and the Court held that the Fourth Amendment created 
a general right to file actions for damages in cases where federal offi-
cials violate constitutional or statutory rights.109  Soon after, lower 
courts began applying the Bivens remedy to other constitutional viola-
tions of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.110 
In determining whether to recognize a remedy in Bivens, the 
Court found that the plaintiff could recover monetary damages as 
long as there existed “no special factors counseling hesitation in the 
absence of affirmative action by Congress” and “no explicit congres-
sional declaration[s] that persons injured by a federal offic-
er[] . . . may not recover money damages from the agents, but must 
instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view 
of Congress.”111  When no alternative remedy exists, courts must then 
“‘pay[] particular heed . . . to any special factors counseling hesita-
tion before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation,’”112 and in the 
wide array of cases the Supreme Court has heard post-Bivens, it has 
oftentimes “identified multiple ‘special factors’ to discourage courts 
from implying a remedy, and, in most instances, has “found a Bivens 
remedy unjustified.”113 
The Court once again denied the grant of a Bivens remedy in its 
recent decision Hui v. Castenada,114 where it reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s grant of a Bivens remedy to the family of Francisco Castenada, 
 
108 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
109 Id. at 392. 
110 See Sripiya Narasimhan, Comment, Does “Keep Out!” Mean “Stay Out!”?:  The Immigration 
and Nationality Act’s Effect on Access to Federal Courts for Constitutional Actions, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1443, 1450 (2010) (“The Court quickly signaled to the lower courts and poten-
tial plaintiffs that Bivens could be applied to other constitutional violations.”); see also Da-
vis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 244 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff in the case had a Bi-
vens cause of action for a violation of her Fifth Amendment Due Process rights). 
111 Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97. 
112 Al-Zahrani v. Rumsfeld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 111 (2010) (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 
367, 378 (1983)). 
113 Id. (citing Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 549–50 (2007)).  In Wilkie, the Court made a 
clear statement regarding its view of Bivens actions:  “[W]e have . . . held that any frees-
tanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a judg-
ment about the best way to implement a constitutional guarantee; it is not an automatic 
entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected inter-
est . . . .” Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
114 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1855 (2010). 
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who died of cancer in immigration detention when officers consis-
tently denied his requests to see a physician for a biopsy.115  The Court 
was generally hesitant to imply a new remedy where one potentially 
existed and then dismissed the case on a technicality, finding that 42 
U.S.C § 233(a) granted “absolute immunity to PHS officers and em-
ployees for actions arising out of the performance of medical or re-
lated functions within the scope of their employment by barring all 
actions against them for such conduct.”116  The Court did not directly 
state that detained immigrants protesting conditions of confinement 
cannot make use of the Bivens remedy, but by allowing health offi-
cials’ qualified immunity to protect them against suit, the remedy 
does not seem to have the strength that is necessary to alleviate the 
suffering of detained noncitizens. 
Thus overall, recourse to Bivens is not a viable option for detained 
noncitizens eager to challenge the conditions of their confinement.117  
In addition to having to base the claim in a violation of some consti-
tutional right, the Supreme Court has also been extremely hesitant to 
grant the remedy for fear of opening up the floodgates to enormous 
amounts of litigation in the federal courts.  While it may seem as 
though noncitizens have a perfectly viable option in Bivens, that is not 
the case, and some other method is needed for them to effectively 
challenge the deplorable conditions of their confinement. 
II.  THE SOLUTION:  THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
While noncitizens have some constitutional means of protesting 
the duration and conditions of their detention, the remedy is imper-
fect and does not fully compensate detained immigrants forced to 
live in squalid, inhumane conditions for long periods of time with lit-
tle or no access to their families and legal counsel.  Recourse to in-
ternational human rights law and the Alien Tort Statute in these 
conditions could prove to be a useful tool for these detained immi-
grants to receive recognition of their plight while also receiving com-
pensation for their suffering.  This Part will discuss a brief history of 
the Alien Tort Statute, the human rights norms that could sustain a 
claim, how that claim would be structured, and what obstacles might 
need to be overcome. 
 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 1851. 
117 See Correctional Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding that implied damag-
es actions recognized in Bivens should not be extended to allow recovery against a private 
corporation operating a halfway house under contract with the Bureau of Prisons). 
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A. The Alien Tort Statute:  A Brief History 
The Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), adopted by Congress in 1789 as 
part of the first Judiciary Act and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350, reads:  
“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States.”118  The statute remained in the 
shadows for over two hundred years119 but was put in the spotlight in 
1980 in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala,120 a landmark decision that interpreted 
the statute to permit claims for modern human rights violations, 
opening the door for such litigation in U.S. courts.121  In that case, a 
Paraguayan national was tortured to death by Peña-Irala, the Inspec-
tor General of Police in Asunción.122  When Peña came to the United 
States, the victim’s sister and father filed suit, invoking the ATS and 
seeking damages.123  The main issue litigated was whether a govern-
ment’s torture of its own citizens constituted a “violation of the law of 
nations.”124  The Second Circuit, in “[c]onstruing this rarely-invoked 
provision,” held that “deliberate torture perpetrated under color of 
official authority violates universally accepted norms of the interna-
tional law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the par-
ties.”125  The court ruled that the ATS incorporated modern, evolving 
international law norms and closed with a ringing endorsement of 
the power of human rights norms: 
In the twentieth century the international community has come to rec-
ognize the common danger posed by the flagrant disregard of basic hu-
man rights and particularly the right to be free of torture. . . . Indeed, for 
purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become—like the pirate and 
slaver trader before him—hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.  
Our holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by 
our First Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the 
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.126 
The court in Filartiga essentially held that customary international law 
is federal common law, thus “instruct[ing] American courts that es-
tablished norms of international human rights under customary in-
 
118 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
119 William A. Fletcher, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, International 
Human Rights in American Courts, Ola B. Smith Lecture at the University of Virginia 
School of Law (Apr. 20, 2006), in 93 VA. L. REV. 653, 656 (2007). 
120 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 878. 
123 Id. at 878–79. 
124 Id. at 880 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125 Id. at 878. 
126 Id. at 890. 
Feb. 2012] IMMIGRANT DETAINEES 801 
 
ternational law were binding on all American courts as federal com-
mon law.”127  It declared that these established norms of international 
law may first “be ascertained by consulting the work of jurists . . . or 
by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions 
recognizing and enforcing that law,”128 and then confirmed as “a set-
tled rule of international law” by “the general assent of civilized na-
tions” over many years.129 
Later cases, following in Filartiga’s footsteps, often adopted its 
“passionate tone,” finding that the ATS covered a “small core of ac-
tionable human rights violations in addition to torture, including 
summary execution, disappearance, war crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, slavery, and arbitrary detention.”130 
However, it was not until 2004 in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain131 that the 
Supreme Court issued a definitive statement regarding the future of 
ATS litigation and its reliance upon international human rights 
norms.  The case involved a civil lawsuit brought by Dr. Alvarez-
Machain, a Mexican national, who alleged that he was abducted by 
Sosa at the behest of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and forcibly 
brought into the United States to stand trial; he brought suit against 
Sosa, his abductor, along with the DEA and the United States gov-
ernment.132  The Court began its opinion by clarifying that the ATS is 
a jurisdictional statute, enacted on the understanding that “the 
common law would provide a cause of action for the modest number 
of international law violations with a potential for personal liability.”133  
The Court then went on to clarify specifically what kinds of violations 
of international law the statute covered, concluding that the “narrow 
class of international norms” actionable under the ATS are those “of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined 
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century pa-
radigms we have recognized.”134  Thus, the Court, while affirming the 
validity and usefulness of ATS litigation, made sure to limit its use to a 
specified set of norms, those with definite content and widespread 
 
127 Fletcher, supra note 119, at 657. 
128 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 160–61 (1820)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
129 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
130 Beth Stephens, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain:  “The Door is Still Ajar” for Human 
Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 BROOKLYN L. REV. 533, 537 (2004). 
131 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
132 Id. at 697. 
133 Stephens, supra note 130, at 546 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
134 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25, 729. 
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acceptance.135  But, the Court continued on to state that “the door is 
still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping.”136 
In its discussion of those norms it considered to be widely ac-
cepted and specifically defined, the Court conducted a review of the 
norm of arbitrary detention in response to Alvarez-Machain’s claims 
that his arrest violated international law because it “exceed[ed] posi-
tive authorization to detain under the domestic law of some govern-
ment, regardless of the circumstances.”137  The Court disagreed with 
his broad definition of arbitrary detention and instead set forth what 
appeared at first glance to be a damning analysis of what many in the 
global community considered to be a well-established and well-
supported norm of international law:  “It is enough to hold that a 
single illegal detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of 
custody to lawful authorities and a prompt arraignment, violates no 
norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the 
creation of a federal remedy.”138 
However, to interpret the Court’s proclamation in this case as un-
dermining the status of the prohibition against arbitrary arrest and 
detention would be incongruous.  The “physical security of persons 
against arrest and imprisonment without due process of law has long 
been considered a basic human right and a fundamental principle of 
liberal democracy”139 and it is important to note that at no point did 
the Court “declare that the arrest and detention of Alvarez-Machain 
had been lawful, only that he had failed to prove that his treatment 
violated an international norm.”140  Thus, it was not necessarily the 
case that the Court disapproved of the use of the norm against arbi-
trary detention as an anchor for ATS litigation but more that Alvarez-
Machain’s individual situation did not meet the standard.141 
As the door is still ajar, detained immigrants with both arbitrary 
detention and conditions of confinement claims should not shy away 
 
135 Stephens, supra note 130, at 551. 
136 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
137 Id. at 736. 
138 Id. at 738. 
139  Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest:  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the 
Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2241, 2279 
(2004). 
140 Id. at 81 (2004). 
141 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737 (“Any credible invocation of a principle against arbitrary deten-
tion that the civilized world accepts as binding customary international law requires a fac-
tual basis beyond relatively brief detention in excess of positive authority.”).  From this it 
is obvious that the Court does not believe that the prohibition against arbitrary detention 
is not an established norm but just that in this particular situation, Alvarez-Machain’s 
treatment did not meet the high standard. 
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from asserting their claims in federal court, especially given the new 
wave of ATS litigation concerning suits against corporate defendants.  
As seen from the history of the use of the ATS, it is constantly chang-
ing and adapting to the needs of the people at the time, and given 
the recent public spotlight on the conditions faced by detained im-
migrants in U.S. detention facilities, it is highly plausible that the 
right ATS claim might just spur another revolution in the future of 
ATS litigation.142 
B. The Logistics of Bringing a Claim under the ATS 
“All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humani-
ty and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.”143  
This statement regarding how all detained human beings should be 
treated asserts a standard that, sadly, the United States has failed to 
realize, necessitating the use of ATS claims based on this and other 
international human rights provisions on behalf of detained immi-
grants.  In order to successfully argue a claim under the ATS protest-
ing the conditions of confinement, a detained immigrant first needs 
to base the claim in either customary international law or a treaty of 
the United States.  Prohibitions against cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment can be found in The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”), and the Convention Against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“the Tor-
ture Convention”).144  While the United States is a party to both the 
ICCPR and the Torture Convention, its accession is subject to various 
reservations, understandings, and declarations. 
 
142 See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that claims regard-
ing non-consensual medical experimentation fall under the category of customary inter-
national law and can thus be used to base ATS jurisdiction). 
143 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 10, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 176 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
144 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 
(Dec. 10, 1948) (stating the United Nation’s declaration of the equal and inalienable 
rights and fundamental freedoms of each human being); ICCPR, supra note 143, art. 7, at 
175 (presenting the United Nations’ recognition of the equal and inalienable rights of 
the human family, founded in freedom, justice, and peace); Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 16, adopted Dec. 
10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 116 (1988); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(d) 
(1987) (“A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices, en-
courages, or condones . . . torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”). 
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The United States’ reservations to both the ICCPR and Torture 
Convention state that it is bound by the cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment prohibitions only to the extent that those words mimic the 
cruel and unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, 
Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments.145  According to U.S. case 
law, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment occurs in civil detention 
only “when the alleged treatment constitutes ‘punishment,’” a de-
termination that is ultimately made by the fact-finder, such as a judge 
or jury.146  Given the state of U.S. immigration detention centers and 
the fact that they have been described as akin to a prison environ-
ment, the problematic conditions can and often do constitute “pu-
nishment,” thus violating the United States’ obligations to refrain 
from inflicting cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on its detai-
nees.147 
But all of this is seemingly for naught given the United States’ dec-
laration that both the ICCPR and Torture Convention are non-self-
executing, meaning that they do not create a private right of action 
absent express congressional legislation.148  Thus, immigrant detai-
nees cannot directly ground their ATS claims on United States treaty 
obligations under the ICCPR and Torture Convention, but that does 
not foreclose their option of using these treaty obligations as strong 
evidence of a customary international norm against cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment.  Significantly, the Court in Sosa recognized 
this as well, noting that while non-self-executing treaties are not in-
dependently enforceable, they may be used as evidence of binding 
customary international law.149 
“[O]ver time, it is possible for state practice to create a legally 
binding rule in the form of customary international law . . . [which] 
 
145 See 138 CONG. REC. S4781 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Claiborne Pell re-
garding Senate consideration of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights); 136 CONG. REC. S17486 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (detailing the Senate’s consent 
to the ratification of The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment). 
146 Gwynne Skinner, Bringing International Law to Bear on the Detention of Refugees in the United 
States, 16 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISPUTE RES. 270, 284 (2008) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 
441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979)). 
147 Id. at 285 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (“[W]hile treaties ‘may comprise interna-
tional commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted im-
plementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-executing and is 
ratified on these terms.’”). 
149 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734–35 (2004). 
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once established, is universally binding.”150  Generally, customary in-
ternational law emerges if there is “consistent state practice coupled 
with opinio juris, a belief that such conduct is legally required.”151  The 
Torture Convention defines cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
as “acts which inflict mental or physical suffering, anguish, humilia-
tion, fear, and debasement, which fall short of torture.”152  When one 
looks to the sources of international law identified in Sosa, treaties, 
judicial decisions, the practice of governments, and the opinions of 
international scholars, “it is clear that there exists a universal, defina-
ble, and obligatory prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment . . . actionable under the AT[S].”153  The 
prohibition against cruel, unusual, or degrading treatment or pu-
nishment can be found in numerous restatements, declarations, con-
ventions, and treaties.154  It can also be found in regional human 
rights instruments and cases from the International Court of Justice, 
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights, and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights.155  The United States has specific international policy 
guidelines making it clear that abstention from cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment is an expectation of other states 
 
150 Jeffrey Loan, Comment, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain:  Extraterritorial Abduction and the Rights of 
Individuals Under International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 253, 267 (2005). 
151 Id. 
152 Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 452 F.3d 1284, 1285 n.1 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(Barkett, J., dissenting) (citing Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. 101-30, 2d Sess. 13 (1990)). 
153 Aldana, 452 F.3d at 1285 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
154 See e.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 144, art. 5 (“No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”); 
ICCPR, supra note 143, art. 7, at 175 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”); Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, supra note 144, arts. 1, 
16 (“Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction 
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to torture as defined in article 1.”); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 
5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (“Every person has the right to 
have his physical, mental, and moral integrity respected”); Declaration on the Protection 
of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 
1975) (“Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment is an offense to human dignity”);  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 144, § 702 (“A state violates international law 
if . . . it practices, encourages or condones . . . cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment . . . .”). 
155 Aldana, 452 F.3d at 1286 (Barkett, J., dissenting). 
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and a settled global norm.156  Finally, numerous U.S. courts have rec-
ognized that the prohibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment is a norm of customary international law.157  
Thus, there exists a global consensus regarding the status of the pro-
hibition against cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment as a well-
established norm of international law.158  This widespread evidence 
from sources both inside and outside the United States should defi-
nitely meet the stricter standard set forth in Sosa that the norm be 
“specific, universal, and obligatory.”159 
C. Potential Obstacles 
Once a basis for jurisdiction under the ATS has been established, 
the next hurdle is overcoming sovereign immunity.  The United 
States government generally enjoys sovereign immunity, which 
shields it from civil suits, unless that immunity is waived.160  While it 
 
156 Id. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1733(j) (2006), which prohibits agricultural commodities to coun-
tries that practice cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 22 U.S.C. 
§ 262d(a)(1) (2006), which states that U.S. policy is to channel international assistance 
away from countries that practice cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment; 22 U.S.C. § 
2151n (2006), which prohibits development assistance to countries that practice cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; and 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (2006), which 
prohibits security assistance to countries that practice cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment). 
157 See, e.g., Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1321–22 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment has been condemned by numerous 
sources of international law and that conduct that meets its exacting standards may be 
punishable under the ATCA); Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002) (“That it may present difficulties to pinpoint precisely where on the spectrum of 
atrocities the shades of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment bleed into torture should 
not detract from what really goes to the essence of any uncertainty:  that . . . the infliction 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment by agents of the state, as closely akin to or ad-
junct of torture, is universally condemned and renounced as offending internationally 
recognized norms of civilized conduct.”); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 Civ. 
8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (finding that cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment is actionable under the ATCA). 
158 Currently, the ICCPR has 167 nations that are parties to it, see International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-4.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 
2011), and the Torture Convention has 149 nations that are parties to it, see Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNITED 
NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume
%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-9.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
159 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (citing In re Estate of Marcos, Human 
Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
160 See Gray v. Bell, 712 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming that “the United States is 
protected by the reservation of sovereign immunity in the ‘discretionary function’ excep-
tion to the Federal Tort Claims Act”). 
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has been argued that suits under the ATS would not be successful for 
achieving redress for aliens subjected to human rights abuses, this 
might not be the case.  The argument disfavoring reliance on the 
ATS is that it “does not independently waive U.S. sovereign immuni-
ty.”  Since the ATS is “jurisdictional and only creates a mechanism for 
enforcing international law, it does not, in itself, create a private 
cause of action.”161  This argument is counterintuitive though, espe-
cially given that the primary purpose of the ATS is to “challenge state 
action that has allegedly violated international human rights.”162  
Courts should not recognize a government’s assertion of sovereign 
immunity in situations where grave human rights abuses have been 
reported.  Sovereign immunity “is limited in international law by ob-
ligations called erga omnes, which are owed to the international com-
munity rather than to any particular state.”163 
The Supreme Court echoed these sentiments, albeit indirectly, in 
Rasul v. Bush, holding that “courts of the United States have tradi-
tionally been open to nonresident aliens”164 and that the ATS “expli-
citly confers the privilege of suing for an actionable tort.”165  Thus, the 
Court remanded the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia to consider the merits of the petitioners’ ATS claims re-
garding their indefinite detention, implying that the District Court’s 
initial refusal to hear these claims because they were barred by sove-
reign immunity was incorrect.166 
An additional development in the field of ATS litigation that will 
ease the problem of overcoming federal sovereign immunity is the 
rise of ATS litigation involving corporations and private government 
contractors.  This is significant because a large number of immigra-
tion detention centers are privately run.  In Jama v. INS, various for-
eign nationals and refugees filed a complaint against Esmor Correc-
tional Services (now Correctional Services Corporation), a private 
detention center under contract with the U.S. Immigration and Na-
turalization Service (“INS”).167  Plaintiffs brought suit against the INS, 
INS officials in their individual capacities, Esmor Correctional Servic-
 
161 Ellison, supra note 70, at 24. 
162 Irena Nikolic, Comment, The Viability of Guantánamo Bay Detainees’ Alien Tort Statute Claims 
Seeking Damages for Violations of the International Law Against Arbitrary Detention, 37 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 893, 921 (2007). 
163 Id. at 925 (citing Andrea Bianchi, Immunity Versus Human Rights:  The Pinochet Case, 10 
EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 237, 271 (1999)). 
164 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
165 Id. at 485. 
166 Id.  
167 Jama v. INS, 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 345 (D.N.J. 2004). 
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es as a corporation, and Esmor guards in their individual capacities, 
and the court held that while the INS was protected by foreign sove-
reign immunity,168 the INS officials, Esmor the corporation, and the 
Esmor guards were not entitled to the protections of sovereign im-
munity.169 
The court explicitly held that “Esmor was clearly a contractor with 
the United States” and could not “be held to be employees of the 
government insulated from liability” because “Esmor and its em-
ployees in fact ran the Facility” without much effective control as-
serted by the INS.170  From here it becomes clear that detained nonci-
tizens could potentially bring effective claims for relief against correc-
corrections officers and the correctional corporations they work for 
as sovereign immunity does not seem to extend to them.  In Jama, 
Esmor tried to assert immunity by claiming a government contractor 
defense, but the court struck that down as well, holding that “[i]n the 
case of the INS . . . there is no federal statute expressly authorizing it 
to contract with private companies to provide detention facilities for 
aliens.”171 
The federal contractor defense originated in Boyle v. United Tech-
nologies Corp.,172 where “the Court found that state tort law significant-
ly conflicted with and had to give way to ‘uniquely federal interests’” 
and that “‘[d]isplacement will occur only where . . . a ‘significant con-
flict’ exists between an identifiable ‘federal policy or interest and the 
[operation] of state law’ or [where] the application of state law would 
‘frustrate specific objectives’ of federal legislation.’”173  In situations 
where courts are balancing the government contractor defense 
against the ATS, the protection of the “uniquely federal interest” in a 
U.S. statute seemingly outweighs a government contractor’s sovereign 
immunity defense, especially since most human rights abuses alleged 
by ATS plaintiffs will presumably violate official U.S. policies as well.174 
Lastly, a rather novel argument that Guantanamo detainees have 
started to use to circumvent the government’s sovereign immunity 
defense that might prove useful to noncitizens detained in immigra-
tion facilities within the United States is reference to the Administra-
 
168 Id. at 349 (citing the court’s prior opinion in the same case, Jama v. INS, 22 F. Supp. 2d 
353, 365 (D.N.J. 1998)). 
169 Id. (citing the court’s prior opinion in the same case, Jama, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 365). 
170 Id. at 357. 
171 Id. at 356. 
172 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988). 
173 Jenny S. Lam, Comment, Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort 
Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459, 1485 (2009) (citing Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504, 507). 
174 Lam, supra note 173, at 1486–87. 
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tive Procedure Act (“APA”).175  Detainees have asserted, in response 
to the claim that the ATS does not itself waive sovereign immunity, 
that the APA does by providing for judicial review for “any person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action . . . [and] seeking relief 
other than money damages.”176  Petitioners in In re Guantanamo Detai-
nee Cases177 did in fact argue that violations of the ATS constituted 
such “legal wrongs” and sought injunctive relief and acknowledge-
ment that “the conditions of their confinement violate[d] customary 
international law and international treaties prohibiting pro-
longed . . . detention.”178 
The APA might prove to be a viable solution at getting around the 
sovereign immunity defense because it provides a presumption that 
agency action is reviewable absent express statutory preclusion or ex-
plicit and exclusive delegation to the discretion of the agency by 
law.179  It also mandates review of an agency where there is “no other 
adequate remedy in a court.”180  Consequently, if noncitizens are able 
to establish that ICE is an agency within the meaning of the APA, they 
can then argue that ICE’s actions with respect to their confinement is 
subject to judicial review because they have no other remedy in court.  
This method would potentially allow noncitizens detained in immi-
gration detention centers to present their claims based on violations 
of international human rights law in United States federal courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Sosa spurred a verita-
ble revolution in the use of ATS litigation to address new and novel 
human rights abuses.  With both the ATS and a little imaginative la-
wyering, detained immigrants protesting conditions of confinement 
based on the customary international norm against cruel, inhuman, 
and degrading treatment have a high probability of being heard and 
compensated.  At this point, conditions in immigration detention 
centers are deplorable and perhaps reminding the courts that nonci-
 
175 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–06 (2006). 
176 See id. at § 702; see also Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 207–08 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(acknowledging that the APA may waive sovereign immunity under the ATS). 
177 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005).  
178 Petitioners’ Memorandum in Opposition to Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss at 45, In re 
Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (No. 04-CV-1166). 
179 See Von Clemm v. Banuelos, 365 F. Supp. 477, 481 (D. Mass. 1973), aff’d 498 F.2d 163 (1st 
Cir. 1974). 
180 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action 
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review.”). 
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tizen detainees are human beings deserving of respect, dignity, and 
fair treatment will help further their cause and achieve immigration 
detention reform.  This is especially true today as there exists individ-
uals and groups who would like to further inhibit the natural and in-
violable rights due to all human beings, legal or not.181 
In September 2008, ICE formulated forty-one new performance-
based detention standards, which were to take full effect in all deten-
tion facilities in January 2010.182  The standards are broken down into 
categories such as “safety,” “security,” “order,” and “care.”183  They in-
clude provisions that are aimed to address some of the biggest prob-
lems in detention centers, like access to medical care.184  However, 
while implementing these measures is a step in the right direction, 
the standards are still only guidelines and are not legally enforceable.  
Additionally, while there exists pending legislation to rectify the sad 
state of immigration detention centers,185 until this legislation is ac-
 
181 See Keep Our Communities Safe Act of 2011, H.R. 1932, 112th Cong. (2011), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/news/pdfs/Keep%20Our%20Communities%20Safe.pdf; see 
also Oppose H.R. 1932:  Prolonged and Indefinite Detention, ACLU, http://www. aclu.org/files
/assets/hr_1932_issue_brief_final.pdf  (last updated Aug. 2, 2011); Chris Rickerd, Ex-
panded Immigration Detention:  Locking Up Those Yearning to Breathe Free, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Nov. 1, 2011, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/end-ice-abuse/expanded-immigration-
dete_b_1067254.html, for a description of the proposed legislation, introduced by Rep. 
Lamar Smith (R-Texas).  The bill would authorize the prolonged, indefinite detention of 
immigrants by allowing DHS to detain individuals without a bond hearing before an im-
migration judge while they wait for a final resolution in their cases (which can often take 
years) and allowing the indefinite detention, potentially for life, of those who have been 
ordered removed but cannot be deported.  Id.  This proposed bill would directly impinge 
upon the due process rights of immigrants and directly contravene what the Supreme 
Court held in Zadvydas v. Davis. 
182 Press Release, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, ICE Announces New Perfor-
mance-Based National Detention Standards for All ICE Detention Facilities (Sep. 12, 
2008), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0809/080912washington.htm. 
183 2008 Operations Manual ICE Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS), U.S. 
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2008/ 
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
184 See id.; see also ICE/DRO Detention Standard:  Medical Care, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/medical_care. 
pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) (“This Detention Standard ensures that detainees have 
access to emergent, urgent, or non-emergent medical, dental, and mental health care 
that are within the scope of services provided by the DIHS, so that their health care needs 
are met in a timely and efficient manner.”). 
185 Maryam N. Mohamed, Legislation to Regulate Immigration Detention System Introduced:  Bills 
Will Protect U.S. Citizens from Unlawful Detention and Ensure Due Process Rights to Detainees, 24 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 107, 107 (2009) (“The Strong STANDARDS (Strong Safe Treatment, 
Avoiding Needless Deaths, and Abuse Reduction in the Detention System) Act sets mini-
mum detention standards and requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to ensure 
that laws concerning the treatment of detainees are properly enforced.” (citing Strong 
STANDARDS Act, S. 1550, 111th Cong. (2009))). 
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tually passed, detained noncitizens must have some other means of 
vindicating their rights. 
What noncitizens need now is an effective and legally enforceable 
means to assert their internationally recognized right to be free from 
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.  This Comment has dem-
onstrated how litigation under the ATS has the ability to achieve for 
noncitizens detained in deplorable conditions a recognition of their 
rights and remuneration for any harms suffered.  The state of immi-
gration detention in this country needs to change, and using the ATS 
to hold the United States government accountable for its actions is a 
first step in the right direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

